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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the district 
court. The Utah Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court has appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Const. Art. VIII, $ 3; Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(i) (1953). This matter is transferable to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(4) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In simple terms, the primary issue on appeal is whether 
plaintiff can state a claim against the defendants for injuries 
allegedly caused by his voluntary intoxication. This is a purely 
legal issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff alleges that on May 21, 1987 he was a patron of 
Studebakerfs, a private club. He alleges he drank to excess and 
became intoxicated. He alleges Studebakerfs negligently 
continued to serve him drinks at his request, though he was 
obviously drunk. He alleges he left Studebaker's and traveled to 
another private club, the Sun. He alleges employees of the Sun 
negligently served him more drinks at his request, despite his 
obvious drunken state. He alleges he literally became falling 
down drunk and hit his head. He seeks to recover for injuries 
which resulted from his own excessive drinking. 
Studebaker's denies each and every allegation of the 
Complaint and can barely resist expounding upon the sordid and 
colorful facts. However, the matter before the court is the 
review of the trial court's grant of a rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss. This court is therefore "obliged to construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and to 
indulge all reasonable inferences in [his] favor." E.g.i Arrow 
Indus, v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). 
Thus, despite the Appellant's unnecessarily inflammatory 
recitation of "facts," rather than "allegations" contained in the 
complaint, Studebaker's will follow the rules and standards of 
review as it understands them. 
There is one fact which is very relevant because it relates 
to the procedure followed in the district court. Page 2 of Mr. 
Horton's brief states: "Memoranda of counsel was timely filed . . 
. ." That statement of fact is incorrect. Plaintiff's memoranda 
was not filed timely. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Plaintiff waived his opposition to the motion to 
dismiss by failing to timely file a memorandum opposing the 
motion. Plaintiff failed to preserve his right to appeal. 
Plaintiff's memoranda to the trial court was untimely under 
the rules of practice of the district court. He should not be 
heard for the first time on appeal. Such a procedure can only 
encourage sloth and subject this court, the trial court and the 
parties to unnecessary expense and delay. 
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2. Plaintiff's recovery is preempted by the Utah Dramshop 
Act. 
The Utah Dramshop Act, Utah Code Ann, § 23A-14-1 et. sea., 
(1953) ("the Act") gives third parties who are injured by an 
intoxicated person a limited recovery. The Act preempts recovery 
for injuries caused by a person's own intoxication. At least the 
following rules of statutory construction dictate this 
conclusion: 
A. Courts will not inflate, expand, stretch or extend 
statutes to matters not falling within their express provisions. 
Allowing Horton to recover in this case would effectively expand 
the statute by judicial fiat. 
B. All terms in an Act must be given meaning. The 
legislature used the terms "third person" when describing those 
who may recover, rather than simply "person." The term "third" 
is a term of limitation and exclusion and must be given meaning. 
C. The primary consideration in interpreting statutes is 
the purpose and intent of the legislature. Express legislative 
purposes of the Act include limiting recovery, prohibiting 
recovery against state agencies or employees and requiring 
actions to be brought within two years. If this court adopts a 
common law recovery for the excessive drinker, that claim will be 
unlimited, may be brought against the state and will ordinarily 
be subject to a four year limitations period. Such a result is 
inconsistent with express legislative intent. 
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D. Statutory interpretations which are unjust or absurd 
must be avoided. As described above, a common law cause of 
action in favor of the drunkard would give the drunkard greater 
rights that an innocent third party would have, an unjust and 
absurd result. 
E. The expression of one thing in a statute excludes by 
implication things not expressed, expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius. Third party recovery is expressly allowed by the Act. 
The Act is silent on the topic of the recovery by the intoxicated 
person. 
F. The legislature is presumed to know existing common law 
and intended to change that common law only as clearly indicated. 
There was no dramshop type recovery at common law when the Act 
was passed. There was no reason for the legislature to expressly 
say "those who drink to excess cannot recover for injuries caused 
by their own intoxication.11 The legislature understood this was 
already Utah common law and so it merely stated the corollary, it 
described those who could recover. 
G. Where the legislature amends a portion of a statute, 
leaving a portion intact, the legislature is presumed to have 
been satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the unaltered 
portions of the statute and to have adopted those constructions 
as consistent with its own intent. The Dramshop Act was passed 
in 1981. Later that same year this court stated there was no 
dramshop recovery, except under the statute, and third parties 
only could recover. In 1985 the Act was repealed and reenacted. 
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The language limiting recovery to third parties was retained. In 
1986, the statute was again amended, but the language limiting 
recovery to third parties was retained. In 1986, this court 
stated once more there was no dramshop recovery except by 
statute. In 1989 the Act was again amended, but the language 
limiting recovery to third parties was retained. There was 
simply no need for the legislature to expressly state that 
"drunks may not recover under the statute." This court said it. 
The legislature by its actions agreed. 
H. This court has the duty to render such interpretation 
of the statutes of Utah as will best promote protection of the 
public. Compensating those who drink to excess and injure 
themselves will only encourage behavior which endangers the 
health and well being of excessive drinkers and innocent citizens 
alike. 
3. By statute, Utah common law is the common law of 
England, which would allow no recovery. 
Utah common law is the common law of England—except where 
repugnant to the state or federal constitutions or laws, or 
inconsistent with the natural and physical condition of the state 
or the necessities of the Utah people. Until very recently, 
there was no dramshop recovery under English or American common 
law, particularly for the person who is injured by his or her own 
excessive drinking. This common law rule is not repugnant to the 
state or federal constitutions or laws, or inconsistent with the 
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natural and physical condition of the state or the necessities of 
the Utah people. 
4. Plaintiff should not be compensated for injuries which 
directly result from his own crimes. 
It was a crime if Mr. Horton purchased alcoholic beverages 
while under the influence of intoxicating beverages or drugs. It 
was also a crime if Mr. Horton became intoxicated to a degree 
that he endangered himself or others. Mr. Horton should not now 
benefit from his own criminal conduct. 
5. As a matter of law, plaintiff's fault was greater than 
that of the defendants. 
Plaintiff may not recover if his own fault was equal to or 
greater than that of the defendants. The effects of alcohol vary 
with the age, weight, physical condition, health, experience, 
genetic makeup and emotional state of the person who is drinking. 
They also vary with the quantity of alcohol consumed, the speed 
at which it is consumed, and the nature and quantity of food, 
water, drugs or other substances consumed before, during and 
after the consumption of alcohol. Plaintiff alone was in a 
position to know all of those factors and judge the effects of 
the alcohol before he became visibly intoxicated. As a matter of 
law, no reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Horton's fault 
was less than that of the defendants. 
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6. Allowing plaintiff to recover for his own excessive 
consumption of alcohol will encourage such excess, to the 
detriment of the health of Utah citizens and contrary to strong 
public policy. 
Intoxication to the point that a person becomes a threat to 
his or her safety or the safety of others is unquestionably 
against strong public policy. Allowing a drunkard to recover for 
injuries caused by his or her own excess can only encourage such 
excess and cause untold pain and suffering of the drunkard and 
the innocent alike. 
7. There is no lustification for altering traditional and 
longstanding rules regarding duty. 
An essential element of a negligence action is a duty owed 
to the plaintiff by the defendant. The law imposes upon one 
party an affirmative duty to look after another's safety only 
when certain special relationships exist. These relationships 
arise when one assumes responsibility for another's safety or 
deprives another of his or her normal opportunities for self-
protection. Those who provide liquor do not assume 
responsibility for their patrons' safety, nor do they deprive 
their patrons of their normal opportunities for self-protection. 
There is no justification for imposing duties upon the defendants 
which are inconsistent with longstanding rules regarding duty. 
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8. If this court allows the plaintiff to recover, it must 
arbitrarily limit recovery or open the flood gates to trivial and 
speculative claims. 
If this court carves out a special duty to drunks, it must 
arbitrarily limit recovery or the courts will be flooded with 
trivial claims or claims where causation and damages are 
speculative. What if Horton had not passed out, but had suffered 
from nausea, vomiting and insomnia? Will it be compensable? 
What if the nausea and vomiting offended a boss or business 
associate, will the drunk be entitled to recover for a lost job, 
a lost business opportunity? Should the drunk recover for 
property damage, a soiled suit or carpet? Property damage to his 
car? What about the drinker who suffers the effects of chronic, 
long-term exposure to alcohol? What about the drinker who claims 
that excessive drinking on one or two occasions at the local 
tavern resulted in his addiction to alcohol? 
9. The legislature is in the best position to regulate the 
sale and consumption of alcohol and the liability from the sale 
and consumption of alcohol. 
The legislative and executive branches control the sale and 
consumption of alcohol as dictated by complex rules, regulations 
and statutes, to serve competing, and sometimes inconsistent, 
goals. The rules governing the sale and consumption of alcoholic 
beverages, and liability for the same, have unique impact upon 
tourism, a major Utah industry, the statefs revenue and the moral 
views and physical health of Utah citizens. The legislature is 
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best suited to deal with these competing interests through the 
political process, with the benefit of input from physical and 
mental health professionals, the liquor commission, the tourism 
industry, and the public. This is an area where judicial 
activism is particularly inappropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF WAIVED HIS OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION 
TO DISMISS BY FAILING TO OPPOSE THE MOTION 
TIMELY, AS REQUIRED BY LOCAL RULES. 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS RIGHT TO 
APPEAL. 
Studebaker's motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum was 
mailed on October 10, 1988. Under rule 2.8(b) of the Rules of 
Practice in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State 
of Utah as they existed then, Mr. Horton was required to file a 
responsive memoranda within ten days. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 6 added three days because the motion had been mailed: 
The responding party shall file and serve upon all 
parties within ten (10) days after service of the 
motion, a statement of answering points and authorities 
and counter-affidavits. 
The filing of a responding brief was not elective. That the 
mandatory "shall" was used was no accident. Rule 2.8(c), sets a 
time limit for filing the reply memoranda of the moving party. 
There the term "may" is used to indicate that the moving party is 
not required to file a reply brief, but if one is to be filed it 
must be filed timely. 
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It should be pointed out the on October 30, 1988, the Code 
of Judicial Administration became effective. Rules 4-501(2) and 
4-501(3) of that code are identical to rules 2.8(b) and 2.8(c). 
The hearing notice was mailed on October 13, 1988 (R.26), so 
plenty of forewarning had been given. At no time did Horton seek 
an extension of time in which to respond. At no time did Horton 
provide the court with an excuse which justified the violation of 
the rules. 
This court has repeatedly held: 
For a question to be considered on appeal, the record must 
clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court 
in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we cannot 
merely assume that it was properly raised. The burden is on 
the parties to make certain that the record they compile 
will adequately preserve their arguments for review in the 
event of an appeal. 
Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 
659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983)). 
The reason for the rule is axiomatic, longstanding, hornbook 
law. The trial court must be given an effective opportunity to 
correct an error. A party who has not properly raised an issue 
where it can be addressed most quickly and economically should 
not be entitled to complain and thereby consume the time and 
resources of this court and other parties. Any other rule would 
give an obstreperous party endless potential for repeated appeals 
and delay. Any other rule would defeat completely the goal of 
efficient administration of justice. This court cannot assume 
the issue was raised at the trial level. 
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This rule is a mere technicality unless this court gives 
substance and meaning to the qualifiers "timely" and 
"sufficient." 
Until the promulgation of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, local rules were essential to assure the orderly, 
impartial and efficient administration of justice. Local rules 
must be enforced to be effective. 
It was a reasonable exercise of the inherent powers of the 
district court to require that those opposing a motion brief the 
issues before the court or accept the granting of the motion. 
The plaintiff failed to timely and sufficiently preserve his 
right to appeal. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH DRAMSHOP ACT PREEMPTS AND PRECLUDES 
COMMON LAW RECOVERY BY A DRUNK FOR INJURIES 
CAUSED BY THE DRUNK1S OWN INTOXICATION. 
The Utah Dramshop Act, Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-1 (1953) 
states: 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise 
provides liquor, or at a location allowing consumption 
on the premises, any alcoholic beverage to a person: 
(a) who is under the age of 21 years or 
(b) who is apparently under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or 
drugs or 
(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic 
beverage knew or should have known from the 
circumstances was under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or 
drugs or 
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(d) who is a known interdicted person and by 
those actions causes the intoxication of that 
person, Is liable for injury in person, property, 
or means of support of any third person, or to the 
spouse, child, or parent of that third person 
resulting from the intoxication . . . . 
(emphasis added). 
As this court observed: 
The Dramshop Act allows third parties to recover from 
those improperly providing liquor, but does not allow 
the intoxicated person to recover from the provider. 
Therefore, one injured as a result of his or her own 
voluntary but unlawful intoxication would appear to be 
without remedy against the provider of the alcohol, 
either under the Dramshop Act or under common law. 
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 417, n.3 (Utah 1986). 
The tenth circuit has gone further and held that the Utah 
Dramshop Act preempts and precludes any common law recovery of a 
person for injuries caused by his or her own voluntary 
intoxication. Tovar v. Lee, Civil No. 84-1540 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(attached as Appen. A). The tenth circuit decision is supported 
by at least the following important rules of statutory 
construction: 
A. Courts will not inflate, expand, stretch or extend statutes 
to matters not falling within their express provisions. 
It is axiomatic that the role of the judiciary in 
interpreting and applying statutes passed by the legislature is 
to discern the intent of the co-equal legislative branch of 
government. "This Courtfs primary responsibility in construing 
legislation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature." 
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984). It is 
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not the role of this court to critique or rewrite legislation or 
second guess decisions of public policy reached through the 
political process. It is for this reason that courts will not 
inflate, expand, stretch or extend statutes to matters not 
falling within their express provisions. E.g.. City of Phoenix 
v. Denofrio, 99 Ariz. 130, 407 P.2d 91, 93 (1965) (en banc). 
Horton asks this court to do exactly that. He would like 
this court to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature 
and supplement the Dramshop Act with a remedy for the drunkard 
when the legislature did not see fit to do so. 
B. All terms used in a statute must be given meaning. 
Utah courts have often held that all of the terms used in a 
statute must be given meaning. In construing legislative 
enactments, the reviewing court assumes each term in the statute 
was used advisedly. "This Court therefore interprets and applies 
the statute according to its literal wording unless it is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." E.g., Home v. Home, 737 
P.2d 244, 247 (Utah App. 1987). 
The terms "third persons" are not unreasonably confused or 
inoperable. They were used to describe those who could recover 
for injuries caused by the drunkard that was improperly served 
alcohol. Had the legislature intended that the drunkard recover 
for his or her own injuries, it would not have gone to the 
trouble of including the term "third." That term is a term of 
limitation and exclusion and should be given meaning. 
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C. The statute must be interpreted in light of its purposes. 
This court has repeatedly held that a statute must be 
interpreted in light of its legislative purposes. "Where 
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not 
look beyond the same to divine legislative intent," Brinkerhoff 
V. Forsvth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1979). According to the 
plain language of the statute, the express purposes of the 
legislature in enacting the Dramshop Act include limiting 
recovery. In addition, the legislature wished to exclude any 
liability of the state or its agencies or employees. Finally, 
the legislature intended any dramshop action be commenced before 
two years. 
If this court adopts a common law recovery, these purposes 
will be destroyed. The excessive drinker will be given unlimited 
recovery against private and governmental persons and entities 
alike. The claim for non-fatal injuries will be subject to a 
four year limitations period. Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-25(3) 
(1953) . 
D. Statutory interpretations that produce unjust or absurd 
results must be avoided. 
A sound rule of statutory interpretation is that a 
statute is presumed not to be intended to produce 
absurd consequences and that where possible it will be 
given a reasonable and sensible construction. 
Curtis v. Harmon Elec, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978). 
If the Dramshop Act does not preempt and preclude a common law 
recovery for the drunkard for injuries caused by his own 
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excesses, and if this court accepts Horton's invitation to adopt 
one, then the drunkard will have much greater rights than an 
innocent third party as described above. This result is nothing 
short of unjust and absurd. 
E. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The expression of 
one thing in a statute is taken to exclude by implication things 
not expressed. 
This is not a hard and fast rule to be blindly applied. Rio 
Grande Motorway, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 21 Utah 377, 
445 P.2d 990, 992 (1968). It is a matter of common logic and 
intuition. This fundamental principal of human understanding 
does not need a fancy name, latin or otherwise. The men's room 
door says simply "men." It does not say: "men. Not women.'1 No 
one would question the fact that the second sentence is by 
implication intended by the first. No one needs a rule of 
construction to understand that the expression of one thing 
ordinarily excludes another. 
F. It is presumed that the legislature was familiar with common 
law as it existed when a statute was enacted. 
It is presumed that the legislature is familiar with the 
state of the common law at the time of enacting a statute. That 
common law becomes part of the statute, except as it is expressly 
changed by the statute. See, E.g., Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244, 
248 (Utah App. 1987) . 
Before the late seventies and early eighties, only a small 
number of states had recognized common law dramshop recovery of 
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any kind. In the late seventies and early eighties, a small 
number of state courts started to change longstanding common law 
rules and allow third parties to recover. See, the appendix in 
Lino v. Jan's Liquors, 237 Kan. 629, 703 P.2d 731, 739 (Kan. 
1985) which lists the status of the law in all fifty states as of 
1985. 
It was against this background that the Utah Dramshop Act 
was passed in 1981. The legislature understood that common law 
allowed no recovery. It changed the no recovery rule for a 
limited recovery rule with respect to third parties only. It 
intended to incorporate the common law rule of no recovery with 
respect to the intoxicated person. The legislature having done 
so, this court is not free to adopt a common law recover for Mr. 
Horton by judicial fiat. 
G. Where the legislature amends a portion of a statute, leaving 
other portions unamended, the legislature is presumed to have 
been satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the unaltered 
portions of the statute and to have adopted those constructions 
as consistent with its own intent. 
This court has repeatedly held: 
Where the legislature amends a portion of a statute, 
leaving other portions unamended, or re-enacts a 
portion without change, absent substantial evidence to 
the contrary, the legislature is presumed to have been 
satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the 
unaltered portions of the statute and to have adopted 
those constructions as consistent with its own intent. 
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American Coal Co, v. Sandstrom, 689 P. 1, 3 (Utah 1984). See 
also, Christensen v. Indust. Comm'n, 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 
1982)• 
The Utah Dramshop Act was initially enacted in 1981, 
effective May, 1981. 1981 Utah Laws, ch. 152. Before the 
statute there had been no common law dramshop recovery in Utah by 
the drunkard or anyone else. Later that same year, this court 
stated: 
Prior to trial, defendants filed motions for 
summary judgment seeking, inter alia, a determination 
that there can be no cause of action against one who 
furnishes liquor in favor of those injured by the 
intoxication of the person so furnished. The trial 
court properly refused to adopt by judicial fiat 
remedies commonly available under so-called "civil 
damage" or "dramshop" acts. 
Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981) (footnotes 
omitted). This court has called this dicta. 
This court noted: 
The reason usually given for this general rule at 
common law is that the drinking of the liquor, and not 
the furnishing of it, is the proximate cause of the 
injury. 
Id. at 1046, n.2 (citation omitted). 
In 1985, the act was repealed and reenacted. Beach v. 
University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 417, n. 3 (Utah 1986); 1985 
Utah Laws, ch.175. The language limiting recovery to third 
parties was retained without change. 
In 1986, this court decided Beach v. University of Utah, 726 
P. 413 (Utah 1986). There this court stated: 
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The Dramshop Act allows third parties to recover from 
those improperly providing liquor, but does not allow 
the intoxicated person to recover from the provider. 
Therefore, one injured as a result of his or her own 
voluntary but unlawful intoxication would appear to be 
without remedy against the provider of the alcohol, 
either under the Dramshop Act or under common law. 
Id. at 417, n. 3 (citation omitted). This is apparently dicta. 
In 1989 the Act was amended again, but the language limiting 
recovery to third parties was retained unchanged. 1989 Utah 
Laws, ch. 240. 
It is much too late for this court to believe the slate is 
clean. This court has interpreted the statute and common law and 
the legislature has agreed. The drunkard cannot recover for 
injuries cause by his own intoxication. 
G. This court has a duty to render such interpretation of the 
statutes of the state as will best promote protection of the 
public. 
"This Court recognizes its duty to render such 
interpretation of the laws as will best promote the protection of 
the public." Curtis v. Harmon Elec, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 
(Utah 1978). 
A rule of liability here could have no other possible 
effect upon patrons than to encourage them to excessive 
liquor consumption at taverns. Forthwith upon the 
announcement of a rule of law which permits a drunken 
patron to recover damages for his own injuries from the 
tavern keeper, patrons who have heretofore felt concern 
for their own safety should they become overly 
intoxicated will relax their personal efforts, for 
three readily apparent reasons. First, because they 
will assume that the bartenders will exercise greater 
care on their behalf; second, because they very 
naturally will feel that if they are hurt they will be 
compensated for such hurt; and third, because we will 
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in effect have encouraged their over indulgence, by 
pampering their delinquency. It cannot be otherwise. 
The already tragic statistics which so horribly 
describe the slaughter of innocent persons by drunk 
drivers will immediately increase, to society's further 
disadvantage. 
Tovar v. Lee, Civil No. 84-1540 at 4-5 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting 
Rindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 611-
12 (1976)). 
This court has said: 
The fact of common knowledge that the drinking driver 
is the cause of so many of the more serious automobile 
accidents is strong evidence in itself to support the 
need for all possible means of deterring persons from 
driving automobiles after drinking, including exposure 
to awards of punitive damages in the event of 
accidents. 
Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 775 (Utah 1988) (quoting Taylor 
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Co., 24 Cal.3d 890, 897, 598 
P.2d 854, 857, 157 Cal.Rptr. 693, 697 (1979). 
The same rationale supports a rule that makes the excessive 
drinker responsible for his own actions and his own injuries. If 
there is any possibility that there will be a deterrent effect, 
this court should adopt the rule that will best deter drunk 
drivers. That rule is one that makes the drunk liable for 
injuries caused to others and injuries caused to himself. The 
drinker is in the very best position to prevent injury to himself 
and others. 
If the dramshop proprietor was held liable for injuries of 
the drunk in addition to injuries to third parties, precious 
little additional deterrent would be provided. 
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This court would certainly not be alone if it held that a 
state dramshop act which allowed recovery to third persons 
precluded recovery by the intoxicated person. E.g.. Connallv v. 
Conlan, 371 N.W.2d 832, 833 (Iowa 1985); Meanv v. Newell, 367 
N.W.2d 472, 474-75 (Minn. 1985). Nor would this court be alone 
if it ruled that a state dramshop act did not preclude common law 
recover. E.g., Kowal v. Hofher, 181 Conn. 355, 436 A.2d 1, 2 
(1980). It is not, however, a question of which group of sheep 
to follow. Each state presumably has a relatively unique 
statute, with unique legislative history and perhaps even unique 
rules of statutory construction which must be followed. The 
issue is whether the Utah Dramshop Act was intended to preclude 
common law recovery. It was. 
POINT III 
BY STATUTE, UTAH COMMON LAW IS THE COMMON LAW 
OF ENGLAND, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF'S 
RECOVERY. 
The Common Law of England, so far as it is not 
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution or 
laws of the United States, or the Constitution or laws 
of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with 
and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of 
this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is 
hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in 
all courts of this state. 
Utah Code Ann., § 68-3-1 (1953). 
There is no question that the exceptions and qualifications 
to the rule are many and broad. Nor is there any dispute that 
portions of Utah common law should evolve predictably and orderly 
in light of changes in societies norms and the needs of Utah's 
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people. This does not mean, however, that the statute can be 
ignored altogether, as if it did not exist. Such a notion would 
be inconsistent with the fundamental fabric of the state 
constitution's balance of power. 
The very basic and time honored principles of law in this 
case have not changed, nor should they. Mr. Horton seeks to 
recover for injuries he claims were caused in part by the 
negligence of others, hardly a novel or new concept given birth 
by changing times, changing societal norms or the unique 
situation in Utah. It would be silly to assume that problems 
associated with the consumption of alcohol are novel or new. 
If anything, the increased potential for physical injury 
afforded by the widespread use of the automobile and power 
machinery, the increased awareness of Utah's citizens to the 
physical, economic, and emotional costs of excessive consumption 
of alcohol, and the moral convictions of a large portion of the 
state's population should compel this court to demand more 
responsibility of those who drink, not less. 
There simply is no justification for modifying the common 
law rule precluding dramshop recovery of a drunk for the injuries 
his own behavior causes him. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BENEFIT FROM HIS OWN 
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR. 
The brief of plaintiff suggests he should be excused for his 
behavior, that of excessive consumption of alcohol, for the very 
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reason that he drank to excess. Horton claims that under the law 
he has no responsibility to monitor or limit his consumption of 
alcohol. The poor dear should be excused, coddled, pitied and 
most of all held immune and harmless. 
Such a position is patently inconsistent with Utah law. It 
was a class C misdemeanor if, as he alleges, Horton was under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor to a degree that he endangered 
himself or others in a public place. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-
701(1) (1953). It was a class B misdemeanor for Horton to 
purchase alcohol while under the influence of alcohol. Utah Code 
Ann. § 32A-12-210 (1953) (formerly Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-13.3; 
1985 Utah Laws, ch. 82, § 2). 
Contrary to plaintiff's position, he is not excused by 
reason of intoxication: 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a 
criminal charge unless such intoxication negates the 
existence of the mental state which is an element of an 
offense; however, if recklessness or criminal 
negligence establishes an element of an offense and the 
actor is unaware of the risk because of the voluntary 
intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in the 
prosecution for that offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1953). Recklessness is a sufficient 
mental state to establish plaintiff's criminal behavior. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-104 (1953). 
This court has found that the drunk may be guilty of 
recklessness in a civil context. Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 
771, 775-76 (Utah 1988) . 
It violates strong public policy to compensate someone for 
the results of his or her own serious criminal behavior. 
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POINT V 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE PLAINTIFF WAS MORE 
NEGLIGENT THAN THE DEFENDANTS. 
If plaintiff was as negligent, or more negligent, than the 
defendants, his recovery is barred. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 
(1953). 
Ordinarily, negligence is a question for the trier of fact. 
However, when reasonable minds cannot differ, the court must rule 
as a matter of law. Reasonable minds cannot differ as to whether 
the person who gets so intoxicated that he passes out and hurts 
himself is at least as negligent as the person who sold him the 
liquor. 
The effects of alcohol on a particular individual vary as a 
function of the following factors: 
(1) age and weight; 
(2) genetic and chemical makeup; 
(3) amount of alcohol consumed; 
(4) speed at which the alcohol is consumed; 
(5) ingestion of other substances such as prescription and 
non-prescription drugs; 
(6) experience; 
(7) the amount of food and nonalcoholic fluids consumed 
with or before the alcohol; 
(8) physical condition; and 
(9) emotional state. 
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The plaintiff knew best his tolerance for alcohol based upon age, 
weight, experience, condition and emotional state. The 
plaintiff, alone, knew what he ingested before entering 
Studebaker's. The plaintiff alone could gage the effects of 
alcohol by how he felt, before the alcohol effected his actions. 
It was plaintiff, alone, who ordered alcohol and decided whether, 
how much and how fast to consume it. Plaintiff was responsible 
to monitor the alcohol consumption of only one person. The 
defendants were required to monitor the consumption of many. It 
was plaintiff alone who left Studebaker's to go to another tavern 
to consume more alcohol. At that point Studebaker's had no 
ability to prevent him from consuming alcohol. When he arrived 
at the Sun, they had no knowledge of his prior ingestion of 
alcohol, food, or other substances. 
The plaintiff's voluntary intoxication does not excuse his 
negligence or modify his duty to act reasonably to protect 
himself from harm. E.g., Tome v. Berea Pewter Mug, Inc., 4 Ohio 
App. 3d 98, 102, 446 N.E.2d 848, 853 (Ohio App. 1982). The 
plaintiff had the same duty of care as a sober person under the 
same circumstances. 
As a matter of law, reasonable people could not find that 
Horton's own negligence was less than that of the defendants. 
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POINT VI 
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO RECOVER FOR HIS OWN 
EXCESSIVE CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL WILL 
ENCOURAGE SUCH EXCESS, TO THE DETRIMENT OF 
THE HEALTH OF UTAH CITIZENS AND CONTRARY TO 
STRONG PUBLIC POLICY. 
This is not just a rehash of the same argument as that 
raised with regard to the interpretation of the Dramshop Act. If 
this court decides that the Act does not preclude commonlaw 
recovery, it must then decide if Utah recognizes such common law 
recovery for the drunkard. Drunk driving is a very serious 
problem. This court has recognized there is a "trend to maximize 
punishment and deterrence of impaired drivers." Johnson v. 
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 775 (Utah 1988). It would be inappropriate 
indeed to give drunk drivers the mixed signal that they will be 
criminally punished, held responsible in civil cases for injuries 
they cause by drinking and driving and even punished in civil 
cases, but, if they manage to injure themselves, the state will 
give them a forum and incur great cost to see that their loss is 
passed along to someone else. 
POINT VII 
THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ALTERING 
LONGSTANDING RULES REGARDING DUTY. THE 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT OWE PLAINTIFF A DUTY TO 
PROTECT HIM FROM HARMING HIMSELF. 
An essential element of a negligence claim is a duty owed to 
the plaintiff by the defendant. E.g., Owens v. Garfield, 784 
P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1989); Beach v. University of Utah, 726 
P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986). 
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Ordinarily, a party does not have an affirmative duty 
to care for another. Absent unusual circumstances 
which justify imposing such an affirmative 
responsibility, "one has no duty to look after the 
safety of another who has become voluntarily 
intoxicated and thus limited his ability to protect 
himself." Benallv v. Robinson, 14 Utah 2d 6, 9, 376 
P.2d 388, 390 (1962). The law imposes upon one party 
an affirmative duty to act only when certain special 
relationships exist between the parties. These 
relationships generally arise when one assumes 
responsibility for another's safety or deprives another 
of his or her normal opportunities for self-protection. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1962). The 
essence of a special relationship is dependence by one 
party upon the other or mutual dependence between the 
parties. 
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415-16 (Utah 1986) 
(footnote omitted). 
Plaintiff seems to argue that criminal statutes regulating 
the sale of alcohol were intended to protect a drunk from the 
effects of consuming too much alcohol. The plaintiff cites to no 
legislative history for this proposition. More importantly, a 
careful analysis of the statutes would seem to indicate that 
they were intended to protect third parties, not drunks. For 
example, it is not illegal to sell an apparently sober person 
copious amounts of alcohol to be consumed at home. Plaintiff can 
purchase numerous twelve packs of beer at one time at nearly any 
store. He can purchase large quantities of hard liquor at a 
state store. There is no statute that requires the seller to 
inquire concerning who will consume it or when. The seller does 
not have an obligation to follow the purchaser home to watch and 
see it is not consumed too quickly. The dramshop operator must 
only monitor plaintiff's drinking in a public place. Nor is it 
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illegal for plaintiff to drink until he is falling down, passed-
out drunk if he chooses to do so at home. The only prohibition 
is drinking in a public place. It would appear that the 
legislature was concerned only about excessive drinking in 
public. The only logical explanation is that when someone drinks 
to excess in public they must at some time go home, a process 
that can maim and kill innocent third parties if the drunk 
decides to drive. 
Studebaker's simply owed plaintiff no special duty to 
protect him from his own excesses. 
POINT IIX 
IF THIS COURT ADOPTS A COMMON LAW RECOVERY IN 
FAVOR OF THOSE WHO DRINK TO EXCESS AND INJURE 
THEMSELVES, IT MUST ARBITRARILY LIMIT 
RECOVERY OR OPEN THE FLOOD GATES TO TRIVIAL 
AND SPECULATIVE CLAIMS. 
It is one thing to protect a drunk from serious personal 
injury. Not all personal injuries are serious. If the plaintiff 
becomes nauseated and vomits, technically that is personal 
injury. Will the drunk recover under the proposed new Utah 
common law? What about the drunk who's excesses cause him to 
sleep late and loose a job, will the dramshop operator be 
responsible? What about the drunk that only bangs his car up 
getting it home, will the dramshop operator be responsible for 
property damage? What about recovery for a soiled suit or 
carpet? 
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What about chronic exposure to alcohol? Will the plaintiff 
have a claim against every dramshop that served him alcohol 
throughout his lifetime? 
The potential for fraudulent claims and the difficulties 
with proving proximate cause are enormous. A patron injures 
himself in a one car accident, but delays seeking medical 
attention for several days. No blood alcohol level is ever 
taken. Was the accident a product of simple negligence that 
would have occurred in any event, or was it proximately caused by 
the consumption of alcohol? What if the claim is not brought for 
four years? The dramshop operator is not likely to remember, and 
the only witness is likely to be the drunk. 
This highlights a glaring paradox in plaintiffs theories. 
The drunk is too drunk to act reasonably or make reasonable 
judgments about his ability to drive, etc. He is however 
competent and likely the only witness who can give his judgment 
as to whether he was apparently drunk such that the dramshop 
operator should not have served him more alcohol. He is 
competent to give his judgment as to whether the accident would 
have happened, but for the alcohol. He is competent to judge the 
actions of others, but not competent to judge or control his own. 
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POINT IX 
THE LEGISLATURE IS IN THE BEST POSITION TO 
REGULATE THE SALE AND CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL 
AND THE LIABILITY FROM THE SALE AND 
CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL. 
Plaintiff maintains that half of the states have accepted 
recovery for drunks, the other half have rejected it. That does 
appear to be roughly correct. See, Annotation, Liability of 
Persons Furnishing Intoxicating Liguor for Injury To or Death of 
Consumer, Outside Coverage of Civil Damage Acts, 89 A.L.R.3d 1230 
(1980) and the cases cited therein. There does not appear to be 
a clear consensus that common law recover for drunks is 
desirable. Such a fact would seem to caution against a rule 
imposes by the judiciary. Close questions are better handled 
through the democratic process. 
This state earns much of its revenue from the sale of 
alcohol and maintains a monopoly on its sale. The legislative 
and executive branches control the sale and consumption of 
alcohol as dictated by complex rules, regulations and statutes. 
The rules regarding the sale of alcohol effect tourism, a 
major industry in Utah. 
The sale and consumption of alcohol has particularly acute 
moral overtones in this state. 
This state has a small population that is spread throughout 
a wide geographic area, most of which is not served by any means 
of public transportation. This makes the problem of the drunken 
driver particularly acute. 
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As in other states the sale and consumption of alcohol 
effects the physical and mental health of Utah's citizens. 
Plaintiff's brief makes grandiose, unsupported statements 
about the drunk's ability for self control. This court is not 
well suited to judge that. 
This court is particularly poorly suited to weighing all of 
these many competing interests. It should be left to democratic 
government where the public has a voice and the legislature has 
access to a broad spectrum of comment from economists, physical 
and mental health care professionals, the tourism industry and 
the general public. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's dismissal of 
plaintiff's complaint should be affirmed. 
DATED this 16th day of October, 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISiPBNSEX & MARTJEtfEJ 
£hawrf E. Draney 
Attorneys for Defen^nt/Appellee 
Studebaker's 
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RICHARD JESSE TOVAR, 
F I L E D 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals 
Tenth Circuit 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT MOV 2 0 M4 
flQffARDK. PHILLIPS 
Plainti f f -Appel lant , 
v. 
MERLIN EVAN LEE, d/b/a 
101 Rancho Service, Virgin, 
Utah, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 84-1540 
(D.C. Civil No. C-83-1077J) 
(D. Utah, Central Division) 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Before BARRETT, DOYLE, and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 
three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 
would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 
appeal. £££. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 10(e). The 
cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 
The issue is whether, under Utah law, an intoxicated person 
has a cause of action against a dram shop owner for personal 
injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident caused by such 
person's voluntary consumption of intoxicating beverages in the 
dram shop. The district court held that under Utah law there was 
no such cause of action. We agree. 
From the complaint we learn that Richard Jesse Tovar, an 
adultf became intoxicated in a tavern owned by Merlin Evan Lee* 
In this regard, it is alleged that Lee, or his agents and 
employees, negligently permitted Tovar to become intoxicated and 
that thereafter, while still in an intoxicated condition, Tovar 
drove his motorcycle off the road and sustained serious personal 
injuries and is now, in fact, a quadriplegic, Tovar sought 
general damages from Lee, the dram shop owner, in the amount of 
$10,000,000* Federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of 
citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
In his answer, Lee first pled that the complaint failed to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Later, Lee 
moved for judgment on the pleadings. Lee's position is that under 
the Utah Dram Shop Act only a third party who sustains injuries 
because of the acts of an intoxicated person has a cause of action 
against the dram shop owner who permitted his patron to become 
intoxiated, and that the Act does not create a cause of action 
against the dram shop owner on behalf of an intoxicated patron who 
himself sustains injury as a result of intoxication. Utah Code 
Ann. § 32-11-1, et seq. (Supp. 1983). At this juncture, Tovar 
sought to amend his complaint so as to include a separate claim 
against Lee based on a Utah statute relating to the maintenance of 
a common or public nuisance. 
The district court denied Tovar1s motion to file an amended 
complaint and granted Leefs motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
A judgment of dismissal followed. Tovar appeals. We affirm. 
The Utah Dram Shop Act creates, in so many words, a cause of 
action in favor of a third party, who sustains injury at the hands 
of an intoxicated person, against the dram shop owner who 
permitted his patron to become intoxicated. Utah Code Ann. § 32-
11-1 (Supp. 1983). However, that statute does ns£ create any such 
cause of action in favor of the intoxicated person against the 
dram shop owner. 
Lee's position is that the Dram Shop Act is preemptive and 
that the only cause of action created by that statute is one in 
favor of an injured third party against the dram shop owner. 
Tovar's position is that .the statute is not preemptive and 
that Tovar, under Utah law, has a common law cause of action 
against Lee, the dram shop owner, or, in the alternative, that he 
has a cause of action under Utah statutory law pertaining to the 
maintenance of a public nuisance. As indicated, the district 
court sustained Lee's position and entered judgment in his favor. 
This is another diversity case which turns on a federal 
judge's understanding of local state law. It would appear that 
the Utah Supreme Court has not yet addressed the precise issue 
here involved. In such circumstance, the view of a resident 
federal district judge on an unsettled question of local state law 
is entitled to some deference by a federal appellate court, and, 
on review, should not be overturned unless the appellate court has 
a rather firm view that the federal district judge erred. See 
Colonial Park Country Club v. Joan of Arc, F.2d (10th 
Cir. 1984) (No. 83-1333); Budde v. Ling-Temco-Vought, 511 F.2d 
1033 (10th Cir. 1975). We have no such feeling in the instant 
case. 
Our attention has not been directed to any Utah case which 
would support Tovar's contention that he has a common law cause of 
action against Lee. The Utah Dram Shop Act creates a cause of 
action in favor of an injured third party against the dram shop 
owner, but creates no corresponding cause of action in favor of an 
intoxicated person who injures himself. We are disinclined to 
disturb the district court's belief that the Utah Dram Shop Act is 
preemptive. In this regard, in Miller v. City of Portland, 288 
Or. 271, 604 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Or. 1980), the Oregon Supreme Court 
(Or. 1980), considering a dram shop act similar to the Utah 
statute, spoke as follows: 
This court has never previously recognized a common law 
cause of action in favor of a person who suffers injury 
resulting from his or her own consumption of alcohol. 
Nor have most other courts. Because it would be 
contrary to apparent legislative policy, we also 
consider it inappropriate to create a common law cause 
of action for physical injury to minors caused by their 
illegal purchase of alcoholic liquor. 
For a general discussion of the policy considerations 
militating against creating a cause of action against a tavern 
owner in favor of one who voluntarily gets intoxicated, see Kindt 
v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976). In 
that case, the court stated: 
A rule of liability here could have no other possible 
effect upon patrons than to encourage them to excessive 
liquor consumption at taverns. Forthwith upon the 
announcement of a rule of law which permits a drunken 
patron to recover damages for his own injuries from the 
tavern keeper, patrons who have heretofore felt concern 
for their own safety should they become overly 
intoxicated will relax their personal efforts, for three 
readily apparent reasons. First, because they will 
assume that the bartenders will exercise greater care on 
their behalf; secondf because they very naturally will 
feel that if they are hurt they will be compensated for 
such hurt; and third, because we . • . will in effect 
have encouraged their over indulgence, by pampering 
their delinquency. It cannot be otherwise. The already 
tragic statistics which so horribly describe the 
slaughter of innocent persons by drunk drivers will 
immediately increase, to society's further disadvantage• 
Id* at 611-12. 
As stated above, the district court refused to allow Tovar to 
amend his complaint so as to include a separate claim based on the 
local statute pertaining to a public nuisancer and such is now 
assigned as error. Although leave to amend shall be freely 
granted when justice so requires, leave to amend need not be 
granted where .the "futility of amendment" is apparent. Mountain 
View v. Abbott Laboratories, 630 F.2d 1383, 1389 (10th Cir. 1980). 
Believing, as we do, that the Utah Dram Shop Act is preemptive, 
there can be no cause of action in favor of Tovar based on any 
public nuisance theory. 
Judgment affirmed. 
HOWARD K. PHILLIPS, Clerk/ 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
This will certify that I caused four (4) copies of this 
Brief of Concept Clubs, Inc. d/b/a/ Studebakers, Appeal No. 
880490 to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, to each of the 
following on the 16th day of October, 1990: 
Kathryn Schuler Denholm, Esq. 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Lee Anne Walker, Esq. 
65 West Century Park Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
The Royal Order of the Sun 
Virginia Curtis Lee, Esq. 
68 South Main Street, 5th Fir. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney on Appeal for Defendant/Appellee 
The Royal Order of the Sun 
DATED this 16th day of October 
-aney, 
Attorney for Defendant 
Studebaker1s 
